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Context
When a state court determines that it must apply the statute of a sister
state, what statutory interpretation methodology should the court use to inter-
pret that statute? Is the forum court free to apply its own rules of statutory
construction, or should it apply those of the sister state?
This question of interpretive methodology is particularly significant be-
cause many states give law-like status to methodology through legislated rules
of interpretation' and judicial interpretive frameworks2 - a practice that schol-
ars have termed "methodological stare decisis."3 Commentators have focused
on courts' interpretations of their own state's statutes, but an emerging area of
scholarship analyzes statutory interpretation methodology from an "intersys-
temic" perspective. Abbe Gluck has examined how state and federal courts ap-
ply one another's interpretive methodologies when interpreting one another's
1. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341 (2010)
(documenting legislated interpretive rules in all fifty states).
2. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754 (2010) ("Several state courts have
implemented formalistic interpretive frameworks that govern all statutory questions.").
3. A growing body of literature describes this practice of "methodological stare decisis,"
through which state courts accord precedential effect to judicial statements concerning
methodology of statutory construction. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 2, at 1754; Jack L. Landau,
Oregon as a Laboratory of Statutory Interpretation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 563, 564 (2011)
(quoting Gluck, supra note 2, at 1754); Alexander I. Platt, Debiasing Statutory Interpretation,
39 OHio N.U. L. REv. 275, 282-85 (2012). Granted there are variations across states, see, e.g.,
Gluck, supra note 2, at 1785-97 (describing Connecticut's legislature-court power struggles
over interpretive rules), and the practice lacks theoretical consensus, compare Sydney Foster,
Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J.
1863, 1884-90 (2008), with Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewksi, Against Methodological Stare
Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573 (2014). But still, there is a growing awareness of the important po-
tential for, not to mention the actual application of, stare decisis for methodology.
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statutes,4 and Nicholas McLean has recently considered the status of foreign
interpretive methodologies in federal court cases construing foreign statutes.'
Intersystemic statutory interpretation in the interstate choice-of-law context,
however, remains unexplored. The choice-of-law literature has also neglected
this issue, focusing almost exclusively on the question of what substantive law
to apply rather than the question of how to apply it.
6
This Comment introduces an intersystemic analysis of statutory interpreta-
tion in multistate cases and offers the first examination of current practices
among state courts. Part I provides background on choice-of-law principles
and demonstrates that they do not provide guidance to courts on how to con-
strue sister state statutes. Part II examines cases in which state courts interpret
sister state statutes and argues that current practices are inconsistent and doc-
trinally unmoored. Part III argues that current ad hoc practices undermine the
policies underlying choice-of-law doctrines and that courts should instead ap-
ply the interpretive methodology of the sister state whose statute is being con-
strued.
I. THE LACK OF INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE IN CHOICE-OF-LAW
PRINCIPLES
State courts routinely apply the statutes of other states.7 While the forum
court generally applies its own procedural rules - such as those concerning the
4. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doc-
trine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011).
5. Nicholas M. McLean, Comment, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation in Transnational Litiga-
tion, 122 YALE L.J. 303 (2012).
6. Few conflict of laws scholars have addressed a state court's obligations when interpreting
sister state law. See William B. Sohn, Note, Supreme Court Review of Misconstructions of Sister
State Law, 98 VA. L. REv. 1861, 1861 & n.3 (2012). The few scholars addressing the issue have
analyzed only the forum court's constitutional obligations to faithfully interpret the sub-
stance of sister state law, and not statutory interpretation methodology. See Michael Steven
Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1237 (2011);
Note, Misconstruction of Sister State Law in Conflict of Laws, 12 STAN. L. REv. 653 (196o);
Sohn, supra.
7. Because substantive laws differ from one state to another, cases involving parties or events
in multiple states require the forum to determine which state's law governs the dispute.
Multistate cases are a common part of state court dockets; in 2013, state supreme and inter-
mediate courts decided 749 choice-of-law cases. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 2o13: Twenty-Seventh Annual Survey, 62 AM. J. CoMP. L. 223, 225 (2014).
Because Westlaw only includes a very small number of trial court decisions, an accurate fig-
ure on the number of choice-of-law cases in state trial courts is unavailable. Id. at 225 n.S.
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admissibility of evidence' and competency of witnesses'- choice-of-law prin-
ciples determine what substantive law governs the case: that of the forum state
or a sister state.'
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that statutory interpretation
methodology defies categorization as simply a procedural device to be gov-
erned by forum law. Unlike procedural rules that regulate the method of pre-
senting facts to the court" and facilitate adjudication,'2 interpretive methodolo-
gy is deeply tied to statutory meaning. Because statutes are merely "strings of
words," statutory meaning is not inherent in the text but instead is derived
from the interaction of the text and the interpretive process. 3 A state's underly-
ing interpretive framework therefore has an inherently substantive foundation
as it is "intimately bound up with" the legal right created by a statute. 4 Accord-
ingly, a closer examination of choice-of-law doctrines concerning substantive
law is necessary to understand how statutory interpretation methodology func-
tions in multistate cases.
States have adopted a wide variety of choice-of-law methodologies to select
the applicable substantive law in multistate cases. Despite this multiplicity of
approaches, however, they all derive from two fundamental types of choice-of-
law analysis -the traditional approach and modern interest analysis. The key
differences between these two theories arise from their normative grounding;
while the traditional approach provides principles for deciding among compet-
ing laws that are external to either state's substantive law, the modern interest
analysis resolves choice-of-law problems by analyzing the competing laws
8. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS 5 138 (1971) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND)]; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT Or LAws § 597 (1934) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (FIRST)].
9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 137; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) supra note 8, §
596.
1o. LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 256-58 (1986). The distinction between substance and procedure in choice of law, how-
ever, is not always clear, as some rules involve both substantive and procedural purposes.
See id. at 257-58.
ii. Id. at 256-57.
12. Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 324 (1990).
13. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HAPv. L. REv. 2085,
2141-42 (2002) (reasoning that statutes are merely "strings of words"); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 321, 345-53 (1990) (arguing that "[h]ermeneutics suggests that the text lacks meaning
until it is interpreted.").
14. BRILMAYERETAL., supra note lo, at 257.
15. Id. at 218.
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themselves.' 6 The traditional approach aims to provide a set of independent ju-
risdiction-selecting rules to determine the applicable law for specific categories
of legal issues.'" For example, the "internal affairs doctrine" instructs courts to
apply the law of the state of incorporation in lawsuits involving corporate gov-
ernance, regardless of the content of the potentially applicable laws.' 8 In con-
trast, modern interest analysis determines the applicable law by examining the
content of and policies motivating each potentially applicable law. 9 Under in-
terest analysis, a court should ascertain the policies underlying the competing
laws through the "familiar" process of statutory construction and decide
whether each state has a legitimate interest in asserting its policy given the facts
of the case at hand.' Some states have adopted either the traditional or mod-
ern approach in its entirety.' Most states, however, have developed choice-of-
law methodologies that incorporate some of the traditional jurisdiction-
selecting principles while also considering the policies of the competing rules of
decision.'
The traditional and modern choice-of-law approaches offer courts guidance
in selecting the applicable substantive law, but both are silent on how courts
should apply that statute and decipher its meaning. Choice-of-law theory stip-
ulates that the forum's lawmaking power is limited, because it cannot overrule
16. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAws 1-6 (2d ed. 1995).
17. William M. Richman & David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the Twenty-
Fifth Anniversary of Its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REv.
1196, 1197-98 (1997).
18. BRILmAYER, supra note 16, at 23; Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal
Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33, 39-40 (2oo6).
19. BRAINERD CuRRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW (1963) is the seminal work
on the theory of interest analysis.
zo. Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J.
459, 462-64 (1985) (quoting CuRRIE, supra note 19, at 183-84).
21. As of 2012, only ten states adhere to the traditional approach in torts cases and twelve states
do so in contract cases. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2012:
Twenty-Sixth Annual Survey, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 217, 278 tbl.i (2013). Only California and the
District of Columbia apply pure interest analysis in torts cases. Id.
22. BRILMAYERET AL., supra note lo; Herma Hill Kay, Currie's Interest Analysis in the 21st Centu-
ry: Losing the Battle, But Winning the War, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 123, 123 (2OOt). For ex-
ample, the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, which is the dominant choice of law meth-
odology among state courts today, includes some traditional territorial jurisdiction-selecting
rules, such as the internal affairs rule. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 313; BRIL-
MAYER ET AL., supra note 1O, at 243-45. At the same time, however, the Second Restatement
directs courts to weigh the policies underlying the competing laws, reflecting the values and
methods of interest analysis. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 6; BRILMAYER ET AL.,
supra note lo, at 243-45.
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a sister state court's determination of its own law;23 a puzzle emerges, however,
when the forum confronts a statutory interpretation question that the sister
state courts have not yet addressed. There is no traditional jurisdiction-
selecting rule for statutory interpretation methodology, perhaps due to an as-
sumption that there is not much of a choice to be made at all. 4 Similarly, even
though interest analysis refers to statutory construction, it describes the pro-
cess as inherently "ad hoc,"'2 leaving courts without meaningful direction in
how to select an interpretive methodology.
This lack of interpretive guidance is particularly significant as many states
have varying approaches to statutory interpretation methodology. While some
cases are clear, such that the statute will yield the same result regardless of rules
of construction, methodological choice can alter the outcomes in other cases.6
For example, Ohio construes remedial statutes liberally,' but Michigan uses
this canon only as a last resort, even where a statute is ambiguous.' Therefore,
in a torts case involving parties and events in Michigan and Ohio, the forum
court's choice of rules of statutory construction could significantly impact the
way in which the court interprets the statute. As a result, although Michigan
and Ohio choice-of-law principles could select the same torts statute, the result
of the case may be different depending on whether the court adopts Michigan
or Ohio rules of construction.
23. Lea Brilmayer, The Other State's Interests, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 233, 235 (1991) [hereinafter
Brilmayer, The Other State's Interests] ("[T]he local judge is acting merely as a proxy for the
foreign lawgiver. In consequence, the local judge has no authority to overrule the other
state's determination of its own law .... [E]ven a judge from the highest court in the state
must adhere to existing interpretations of the other state's legal rules.").
24. See Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1301,
1301 (1989) ("Traditional choice of law analysis presupposes that deciding cases with multi-
state contacts is a two-step process: first one 'chooses' the law that governs the dispute, then
one 'applies' the chosen law. The second step involves the familiar process of interpreting
law to determine the parties' rights in the dispute. The difficulty lies in the first step of the
process: choosing the applicable law.").
25. Brainerd Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. CI. L.
REv. 258, 295 (1961) ("While there are some general principles to guide us, statutory con-
struction must always be an ad hoc process.").
26. See Gluck, supra note 4, at 1961, 1963, 1965-68.
27. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1.11 (West 2014) ("Remedial laws and all proceedings under them
shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtain-
ing justice."); Clark v. Scarpelli, 744 N.E.2d 719, 724 (Ohio 2001).
a8. Crowe v. City of Detroit, 631 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Mich. 2001).
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II. CURRENT PRACTICES IN INTERPRETING SISTER STATE LAW
Without guidance from choice-of-law principles, state courts applying sis-
ter-state statutes use inconsistent interpretive practices. Many courts con-
sciously adopt the interpretive methodology of the state whose statute is being
applied.29 For example, in Magee v. Huppin-Fleck,3° an Illinois appellate court
construed an Oregon statute under the Oregon Supreme Court's formalistic
interpretive regime, known as the PGE framework."' Instead of applying the
Illinois Supreme Court's interpretive principles, the Magee court supported
each step of its analysis with citations to the three-step, tiered PGE frame-
work.' Other courts simply use their own methodologies to construe the stat-
utes of sister states without reference to the sister states' interpretive practic-
es."3 Still other courts, recognizing similarities between forum-state and sister-
state approaches to statutory construction, have cited both states' interpretive
methodologies.' And a few courts seemingly dodge the choice of interpretive
methodology altogether simply by presuming similarity to forum state law
when confronted with unsettled or unclear interpretations of sister state stat-
utes.
35
29. See, e.g., Mariculture Prods., Ltd. v. Those Certain Underwriters, 854 A.2d 11oo, 1107
(Conn. App. Ct. 2004) ("We use Maine's rules of statutory interpretation.., because we are
interpreting Maine law."); Kolberg v. Sullivan Foods, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 8o9, 812 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994) (citing Wisconsin's plain meaning rule to apply a Wisconsin statute); CACV of
Colo., LLC. v. Stevens, 274 P.3d 859, 864 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (citing a Delaware code of in-
terpretation and the Delaware Supreme Court's absurd results canon to interpret a Delaware
statute); Autonation Direct.com, Inc. v. Thomas A. Moorehead, Inc., 278 S.W.3d 470, 473-
74 (Tex. App. 2009) (interpreting a Virginia statute under Virginia's plain meaning rule).
30. 664 N.E.2d 246, 251-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
31. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143 (Or. 1993); see also
Gluck, supra note 2, at 1775-85 (describing the PGE framework).
32. Magee, 664 N.E.2d at 251-52. It is noteworthy, however, that a search of PGE's citing refer-
ences on Westlaw revealed that Magee was the only case where a sister state used the PGE
framework to interpret an Oregon statute.
33. See, e.g., Weber v. U.S. Sterling Secs., Inc., 924 A.2d 816, 823 n.5 (Conn. 2007) ("Although
we apply the substantive law of Delaware[,] ... procedural issues such as how this court in-
terprets statutes are governed by Connecticut law."); Turner v. Ford Motor Co., 265
N.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (employing Michigan interpretive methodology
to construe a Georgia statute).
34. See, e.g., Wilgus v. Estate of Law, 1996 WL 769335, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 1996);
Wooley v. Lucksinger, 20o6-1140 (La. App. i Cir. 20o8), 14 So.3d 311, 414, affid in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 2009-0571, p. 137 (La. 2o11), 61 So.3d 507; Sholes v. Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 6ol N.E.2d 634, 638 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
35. See, e.g., Holly Sugar Corp. v. Union Supply Co., 572 P.2d 148, 150 (Colo. 1977) (concluding
that because there are no Montana precedents on point, "this court must be guided by its
own precedents in interpreting similar statutes"); ROC-Century Assocs. v. Giunta, 658 A.2d
1830
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Even courts within the same state have adopted conflicting approaches. For
example, the Connecticut Supreme Court cited its own precedents and legisla-
tive code of interpretation in construing a Delaware statute,s6 while a Connect-
icut appellate court used Maine's rules of construction to interpret a Maine
statute.17 Furthermore, a Connecticut trial court recently concluded that the is-
sue of which rules of construction apply in interpreting sister state statutes is a
"matter of first impression,", 8 highlighting the doctrinal incoherence and con-
fusion.
As these examples demonstrate, the practice of methodological choice in in-
terpreting sister state statutes remains doctrinally unmoored. Furthermore,
methodological choice in interpreting sister state statutes suffers from concep-
tual looseness, as courts rarely justify their selection of interpretive frame-
works. Instead, many courts construing the statutes of other states simply ap-
ply their own methodologies,39 those of the sister state,40 or both,4' without
explaining or citing authorities to support that choice. The court's analysis in
Autonation Direct.com, Inc. v. Thomas A. Moorehead, Inc. is typical: after con-
cluding that Virginia substantive law applied, the Texas court reasoned it
should "look to Virginia law on statutory construction" but cited no authorities
to justify this methodological choice.4' As a result, it is unclear whether, and to
what extent, choice-of-law principles guided these courts' methodological deci-
sions in construing sister state statutes.
The courts that have attempted to justify their methodological choices offer
unsatisfying explanations. One court adopted sister state methodology as the
most relevant means for "ascertaining substance,"43 and another reasoned that
223, 226 (Me. 1995) ("[I]f New York law is unclear or unsettled, it is appropriate to... ap-
ply[] the law of Maine as the forum state."); Am. Honda Fin. Corp. v. Bennett, 439 N.W.2d
459, 462 (Neb. 1989) ("Where another state's law is unclear or undecided, we assume its
law to be the same as ours and apply Nebraska's law to the dispute.").
36. Weber, 924 A.2d at 823-24.
37. Mariculture Products Ltd. v. Those Certain Underwriters, 854 A.2d 1100, 1107-09 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2004).
38. Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 5781103, at *4 n.4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3,
2013).
39. For example, in Turner, the Michigan court applied its own interpretive methodology to
construe a Florida statute without explaining or citing authorities to support that choice. 265
N.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
40. Mariculture Products, 854 A.2d at 1107.
41. Wilgus v. Estate of Law, 1996 WL 769335, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 1996).
42. 278 S.W.3d 4 7 0, 473 (Tex. App. 2009).
43. Magee v. Huppin-Fleck, 664 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
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applying a different interpretive methodology would be "illogical."' These
courts, however, largely fail to identify the sources of these vague notions and
do not offer supporting authorities.4' It therefore remains unclear which prin-
ciples guide courts' choice of methodology in construing sister state statutes.
III. INTERSYSTEMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION FROM A CHOICE-
OF-LAW PERSPECTIVE
Current ad hoc practices are at odds with the principles underlying choice-
of-law systems; because current practices are doctrinally unmoored, courts pre-
sented with conflicting rules of construction are seemingly free to select the
methodology according to personal predilections without justification. 46 Given
the substantive nature of interpretive methodology and the close relationship
between the interpretive process and statutory meaning, courts should, at the
very least, provide explicit justification for their choice of interpretive method-
ology. Accounting for methodological choice within the choice-of-law analysis
would not only increase transparency concerning the court's reasoning, but
would also provide a rational basis for the court's adoption of a framework that
would help guide future interpreters.
What is the proper role of statutory interpretation methodologies in
choice-of-law doctrines? Abbe Gluck's recent study of intersystemic statutory
interpretation in the federal-state context 47 is instructive, but not readily trans-
ferable, as different considerations animate choice-of-law principles in the
state-state context.4 Accordingly, we must engage with the choice-of-law prin-
44. Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 5781103, at *4 n.4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3,
2013).
45. The court in Magee cited a treatise to justify its choice of sister state methodology, 664
N.E.2d at 251, but even this treatise acknowledges there are conflicting authorities on which
state's interpretive rules apply. 2 N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 37-05 (Sth ed. 1992) ("Although there is authority that the rules of statutory construction
prevailing under the laws of the forum are followed, the rules of the state in which the stat-
ute was enacted should be followed if they have been pleaded and proved.").
46. As a prominent choice-of-law theorist reasoned, "If every court were to determine for itself,
completely without reference to any general principle, the extent to which it chose to be
guided by the foreign law such confusion might well result as to defeat the very purpose of
the rules of the Conflict of Laws." 3 JOSEPH H. BEATE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
1601 (1935).
47. In that article, Gluck argued that federal courts should apply state interpretive methodology
to state statutory questions. Gluck, supra note 4.
48. States are co-equal sovereigns while federal courts have limited powers and lack a general
common law. BRILMAYER ET AL., supra note lo, at 258. In addition, unlike many state courts,
federal courts do not accord principles of statutory construction stare decisis effect. See Fos-
ter, supra note 3, at 1874-75 (noting that the Supreme Court characterizes interpretive prin-
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ciples providing for the application of sister state law to understand how statu-
tory interpretation methodology functions in multistate cases. Generalizations
concerning both statutory interpretation and choice of law in all fifty states are
inherently difficult,49 so resolving the proper role of interpretive methodology
in choice of law ultimately depends on state-specific factors. At a general level,
however, the normative and doctrinal underpinnings of choice-of-law theories
suggest that courts should adopt sister state methodologies when interpreting
statutes of that state -or, at the very least, more explicitly justify decisions to
pair sister state statutory text with the forum state's principles of statutory in-
terpretation.
Directing the forum court to apply the interpretive methodology of the sis-
ter state whose statute is being construed would be most consistent with
choice-of-law principles. A state's underlying interpretive regime is an integral
part of statutory meaning, guiding interpreters in issues such as discerning the
legal consequences of grammatical structures in statutory text, 5  deciding
which types of extrinsic sources have legal effect 5' and whether, and to what ex-
tent, courts can consider substantive norms in deciding statutory questions.2
Furthermore, in many ways, a state's interpretive principles themselves
demonstrate normative policies and values. Substantive canons of interpreta-
tion most clearly represent policy preferences, as virtually all are based on larg-
er norms and values. One critic has called them "dice-loading rules." 3 More
broadly, many interpretive principles reflect "public values," or larger norms
and principles drawn from evolving statutory policy and the common law.4 As
a result, a forum court that construes a sister state statute under its own inter-
pretive regime risks undermining that state's statute as the rule of decision and
instead asserts its own lawmaking power.
ciples as "guides that need not be conclusive" rather than "mandatory rules" (quoting
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001))).
49. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text (describing the variety of choice of law meth-
odologies among state courts today); supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
5o. WILLtAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 848 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the textual canons of con-
struction).
51. Id. at 955 (describing rules of interpretation concerning when and how to consult the com-
mon law, other statutes, legislative history, and agency interpretations).
s2. Id. at 848 (describing the substantive canons of construction).
53. Gluck, supra note 4, at 1984 (quoting Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 28 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997)).
54. William N. Eskridge Jr., Public Values in Statutory Intepretation, 137 U. PA. L. Rev. 1007,
1007-10 (1989).
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The policies underlying choice-of-law principles further militate in favor of
construing sister state statutes with that state's interpretive principles. Alt-
hough choice-of-law theory has varied over time and across jurisdictions,
"[u]niformity of results, regardless of forum, has always been a major goal in
choice-of-law theory.""5 State interpretive methodologies are diverse, rendering
the forum's choice of interpretive framework potentially outcome-
determinative. 6 Interpreting a statute under the same principles of construc-
tion regardless of forum would thus help ensure uniformity of result for liti-
gants. This approach may not provide complete uniformity, because even ap-
plying the rules of construction requires normative judgments' and because
precisely defining a state's statutory interpretation methodology could be chal-
lenging in some cases."' The results, however, would be more uniform than if
each court continued to determine interpretive methodology in an ad hoc
manner.
This approach is also consistent with interest analysis and its focus on leg-
islative intent. By grounding the choice-of-law inquiry in analysis of the poli-
cies underlying substantive laws, interest analysis is thus premised on the nor-
mative goal of furthering legislative intent and purpose. 9 Judicial interpretive
methodology is arguably linked to legislative intent in states where legislators
draft statutes against the backdrop of formalistic interpretive regimes and prec-
edential rules of construction .60 Furthermore, although this is not conclusive
evidence, the fact that many drafting manuals used by state legislative drafting
55. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
1584, 1586 (1966); see also Kramer, supra note 12, at 313 & n.113 (noting that uniformity and
predictability are values that all conflict of laws scholars recognize). The traditional choice of
law approach in particular is intended to promote uniformity of result and discouraging fo-
rum shopping. BRILMAYERET AL., supra note lo, at 220 & n.2o.
56. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
57. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REv.
531, 552 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAw: THE INTER-
PRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)).
58. For example, in states where the legislature and judiciary disagree over the proper method of
statutory interpretation. See Gluck, supra note 2, at 1785-97.
5g. See CURUIE, supra note 19, at 364-65 ("A prime advantage of this approach over traditional
conflict-of-laws methodology is that, while inquiring specifically into the governmental pol-
icies and interests involved, it explicitly recognizes the power of the legislative branch to de-
termine what domestic policy is and when domestic interests require application of that pol-
icy.... ."); Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. Rv.
392, 392 (1980).
60. See Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1389, 1420-21
(2005). Although there is no empirical work documenting state legislators' awareness of the
interpretive regime, anecdotal evidence from Oregon suggests legislators draft statutes with
the Oregon Supreme Court's interpretive framework in mind. Gluck, supra note 4, at 1982.
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offices contain the state's rules of interpretation6' suggests a link between the
state's interpretive methodology and legislative intent. In contrast, applying
another state's methodology or simply presuming similarity to forum law en-
tirely divorces methodological choice from legislative expectations about how a
statute will be construed.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has aimed to introduce the question of methodological se-
lection in choice-of-law cases and provide the first intersystemic analysis of
statutory interpretation in multistate cases. This analysis is significant not only
in contributing to the growing literature concerning statutory interpretation at
the state level but also in shining light on a gap in choice-of-law theory and
doctrine. Examining the intersection between choice-of-law doctrine and statu-
tory interpretation methodology reveals that the issue is poorly understood
from both a practical and a theoretical perspective. Resolving the status of stat-
utory interpretation methodology in choice-of-law doctrines is necessary to
provide theoretical coherence and offer practical guidance to courts determin-
ing how to resolve multistate cases. Although state-specific considerations
must be accounted for in practice, at a general level, applying sister state inter-
pretive methodology when interpreting sister state statutes would best enable
state courts to advance the values underlying choice-of-law principles.
GRACE E. HART
61. See, e.g., Legislative Counsel Comm., Bill Drafting Manual, OR. ST. LEGIS. 20.1-.15
(2012), http://www.lc.state.or.us/pdfs/draftingmanual.pdf [http://perma.cc/EB66-KH95]
(discussing judicial interpretive principles); Texas Legislative Council Drafting Manual,
TEx. LEGIS. COUNCIL app. 5 (2015), http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/legal/dmi/draftingmanual
.pdf [http://perma.cc/3T9W-7P4M] (listing Texas legislature's rules of statutory
construction); Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual 2o11-2o12, Wis. ST. LEGIS. 37-64
(2012), http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/drafting-manuaVgeneral.pdf [http://perma
.cc/9M7P-63RX] (providing guidelines for legislative drafters based on Wisconsin judici-
ary's interpretive principles).
I am especially grateful to Professor Lea Brilmayer, who advised this project and provided
feedback on earlier drafts. Special thanks to Professors Bill Eskridge and Abbe Gluck for in-
spiring interest in the subject and offering helpful ideas during the editing process. Lastly, I
would like to thank Brian Lipshutz, Emily Barnet, Rachel Bayefsky, and the editors of the
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